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1.

Introduction

Twelve states, including Florida, prohibit the interception of wire, oral
and electronic communications without the consent of all parties.' The
public has misunderstood these all-party consent rules as a prohibition on

* The authors are attorneys at the law firm of Hunton & Williams LLP in Miami, Florida. Mr.
Julin submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the Florida Press Association and the Florida Society
of News Editors in McDade v. State, and represented the petitioner in Brugrnann v. State, the two
cases that form the background of this article. Ms. Isani's practice focuses on First Amendment
issues, financial services, and consumer class action litigation. Mr. Julin and Ms. Isani recently
represented the world's largest health information companies in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 13 1 S.
Ct. 2653 (2011), a First Amendment challenge to a law that blocked information gathering. Mr.
Lima's practice focuses on complex commercial litigation and consumer class action defense.

1. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Reporter's Recording Guide -A
State-by-State Guide to Taping Phone Calls and In-Person Conversations, 3 (2012), available at
http://www.rcpforg/rcpf/orders/RECORDINGS.pdf (showing that twelve states require consent
of all parties to intercept communications).
79
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the use of hidden audio recorders by journalists, police, and ordinary
citizens in face-to-face communications. The Florida law imposes no such
restriction, but the courts have been terribly confused by the complex
history and purpose of the law, including its origins in the United States
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This article traces the
origin of the state and federal laws governing interception of
communications and explains how courts should interpret the Florida law
to allow the use of hidden recorders. The Florida Supreme Court is
expected to address this issue in a pending case, McDade v. State,2
involving a young girl who secretly recorded her stepfather making
statements to her in his bedroom. The recording became a key piece of
evidence used to convict him of sexual assaults on the girl. This article
argues that the Florida Supreme Court should affirm the conviction, and
hold that the use of hidden audio recorders is generally lawful in Florida. It
also explains why a contrary result may violate the First Amendment. The
Florida Supreme Court is expected to decide the case in 2015.
II. Background
I came to the realization that the Florida Security of Communications
Act, chapter 934 of the Florida Statutes, is not well understood by many
judges, reporters, or me before I was scheduled to make an oral argument
on the topic in the Florida Supreme Court on March 6, 2014. The briefs in
the case, including my own, had tried to sort through the difficult language
and strange history of the Act, but they frankly left me with many gnawing
questions. So, I arrived in Tallahassee a day early to hole up at the
Doubletree hotel with a laptop, an Internet connection, and the usual
complimentary warm chocolate chip cookie in the hope that isolation might
give me some answers.
A.

The Ice Cream Truck Driver

The argument promised to be interesting because the facts of the case
were disturbing. In 2001, a Mexican woman and her young daughter
moved to Florida's west coast. The woman met and married Richard
McDade, a sixty-year-old ice cream truck driver, when her daughter was
eleven years old.
McDade allegedly molested the young girl and
threatened to have her and her mother deported if she told anyone. She
nevertheless told her mother, a doctor, and two ministers. Her mother

2.
3.

McDade v. State, 114 So. 3d 465, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 468.
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adamantly did not believe her, and when pressed, the girl recanted on more
than one occasion. No one reported the allegations to police.'
When she turned 16, the girl told her boyfriend that she was still being
abused. He gave her his MP3 player and urged her to secretly record her
stepfather the next time he made advances toward her. She did just that
while she and her stepfather were alone together in his bedroom. She then
turned the recording over to police.'
After police filed charges against McDade, his lawyer moved to
suppress the recording on grounds that it had been made in violation of
chapter 934. The argument stirred up an issue that had plagued Florida
residents for forty years: When, if ever, can hidden devices be used to
record a conversation? 7
Reporters have been especially troubled by that question because secret
recordings of interviews provide a way to ensure that a source cannot
disown what he or she has said once the source sees it in print. But chapter
934 was amended in 1974 to make interception, use, or disclosure of at
least some wire and oral communications lawful only if all parties to a
communication consented.8 Since then, Florida courts have gone to great
lengths to avoid interpreting the law to produce catastrophic results as, for
example, where a victim secretly recorded his own murder and the
murderer argued the recording could not be used as evidence against him.9
The trial judge in McDade's case held that the girl's decision to
secretly record her stepfather had not violated the law, and allowed the

4.

Id. at 467.

5. Id. at 467-68.
6. Id.
7. This issue has also plagued non-Florida residents who call into or out of Florida due to a
long-simmering debate over extraterritorial application of the law. In France v. France, 90 So. 3d
860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), pet. for rev. granted, 107 So. 3d 404 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2012), rev.
dismissed by, 120 So. 3d 962 (Fla. Oct. 21, 2013), the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a
person outside of Florida violates chapter 934 when she records a telephone call with a person in
Florida and subjects herself to personal jurisdiction in Florida. The court certified its decision to
the Florida Supreme Court, but the parties settled before the case was decided. The Fifth
District's opinion in Francedirectly contradicts an earlier decision by the Second District Court
of Appeal. See Kountze v. Kountze, 996 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (en banc) (chapter
934 cannot transform an out-of-state act of recording a telephone call that originated in Florida,
standing alone, into a tortious act within Florida for jurisdictional purposes).
8. Act of June 19, 1974, ch. 249, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 694 (codified as FLA. STAT.
§ 943.03(2)(c)).
9. State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 1985) (holding that the victim did not
violate the law because his assailant could not have had a justifiable expectation that he was not
being recorded).

82

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

137:1

recording into evidence. 10 A jury convicted McDade of various crimes,
and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed by a vote of two to one."
All three appellate judges wrote separate opinions. For the majority,
Judge Khouzam found that "suppressing the recordings pursuant to chapter
934 under the circumstances of this case would produce an absurd resulta result we cannot fathom was intended by the legislature." 1 2 Judge
Altenbernd, concurring, expressed doubt about deciding the case on those
grounds. Under the heading "Bad Facts Sometimes Make for Bad Law,"
he suggested that the Florida Supreme Court should reconsider one of its
earlier decisions that construed the law to allow secret taping when the
person taped was engaged in illegal conduct.13 Together, Judges
Khouzam and Altenbernd certified the case to the Florida Supreme Court
as passing on a question of great public importance.14
The dissenting judge insisted McDade's conviction had to be
overturned, as deplorable as that result might be, because the girl had
violated the law when she recorded McDade without his consent. He
argued that if the public and the legislature disliked this result, it was up to
the legislature to fix the law, not the courts.1
B. Taking Flight

Just five days after this decision was rendered, I lost a different chapter
934 case, Brugmann v. State.' 6

In this case, I had argued chapter 934

should be read to allow a client to secretly record the advice provided by
his lawyer and a psychologist working with the lawyer. I reasoned that if
the advice being delivered was unlawful or unethical, they could not have a
justifiable expectation that they were not being recorded. The State took
the position that the secret recording was illegal irrespective of the nature
of the advice given to the client because the secret recordings were made in
the offices of the lawyer and psychologist, and they had a justified
expectation in this location that their communications would not be
intercepted with a hidden device.1 7 The trial court reviewed one of the two
10.

McDade, 114 So. 3d at 468.

11.
12.

Id. at 471.
Id.

13. Id. at 472 (Altenbemd, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 471 (majority opinion) ("Does a recording of solicitation and confirmation of child
sexual abuse made by the minor child fall within the proscription of chapter 934, Florida Statutes
(2010)?").
15. Id. at 475 (Villanti, J., dissenting).
16. 117 So. 3d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (en banc).
17. The state has taken an inconsistent position regarding the admissibility of secret
recordings. Compare Brugmann, 117 So. 3d at 45 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting) (state moves to
suppress the secret recording), and McDade, 114 So. 3d at 467 (state offers the secret recording
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secret tapes and ruled the taping illegal because it "contain[ed] no direct or

indirect evidence of criminal actions by the attorney."' Five judges of the
en banc Third District Court of Appeal allowed that ruling to stand without
writing an opinion, but three judges joined in a ferocious, lengthy dissent
by Judge Rothenberg.1 9 She held that the law does not prevent the secret
recording of illegal conduct and the recording of the psychologist that had
not been reviewed by the trial court might reveal the illegal conduct.20
The Florida Supreme Court could not review the Third District Court
of Appeal's decision in Bruggmann because the majority had written no
opinion. 21 But the Second District Court of Appeal's certification of its
McDade decision created an alternative avenue for the Florida Supreme
Court to review the workings of chapter 934.
Both the Florida Press Association and the Florida Society of News
Editors expressed interest in filing an amicus brief in the Florida
Supreme Court because reporters' activities could be affected by the
Court's decision. I volunteered my services to those organizations as
amicus counsel. The Florida Attorney General welcomed the support and
also offered to share five minutes of her oral argument time.
Preparation for the argument forced me to take a deeper look at the law
than I ever had before. I previously had thought-and often had advised
reporters-that interception, use, and disclosure of wire, oral, and
electronic communications22 without the consent of all parties would
violate the law except in a few very narrow circumstances, such as at a
public meeting or during a crime. This simple interpretation of chapter 934
meant that hidden recorders generally could not be used and, as a result,
reporters typically chose to forego recording interviews altogether to avoid
the ill effects of sticking a microphone in the face of a source.
But my preparation for the McDade oral argument persuaded me that
the law does not prohibit, and never has prohibited, in-person recording of
into evidence). This inconsistency could be explained by the fact that the suppression helped the
state uphold a conviction in the former, but made a conviction more difficult or perhaps
impossible in the latter.
18. State v. Casey, Nos. FO1-7975 & F06-32686, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2009).
19. Brugmann, 117 So. 3d at 40 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
20. Id.
21. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(A); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1980)
(stating that a dissenting opinion cannot provide the basis for express and direct conflict
jurisdiction). It is highly unusual for a Florida appellate court to grant en banc review, affirm the
decision below, and not write an opinion. The majority may have elected to take this strange
action to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from reviewing its decision, but the actual reason
remains unknown.
22. Prior to 1988, the law applied to "wire" and "oral" communications only. In 1988, the
law was updated to include "electronic" communications when cell phone technology was
developed. See Act of July 1, 1988, ch. 184, § 2, 1988 Fla. Laws 1019.
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voices without consent using a hidden recorder. This interpretation is not

readily apparent from the face of chapter 934. The wording of the law is
complex and its history is tied to decades of litigation, a parallel federal
law, and politics. To understand the law, it is critical to examine all three.
During the oral argument in the McDade case, I had so little time to cover
that ground that I frankly could not give the justices the full picture. With
the luxury of more time and space here, I will explain how I reached my
conclusion and how I hope the Florida Supreme Court will rule.
III. Evolution of Federal and State Laws
A.

Bagging a Bootlegger

The story begins 96 years ago when the United States Supreme Court
decided in Olmstead v. United StateS23 that police interception of wire
communications-primarily telephone calls-did not violate the Fourth
Amendment's limits on searches and seizures. Wiretapping was relatively
new at the time and distinct from the physical entry into homes and seizure
of tangible property, which was the classic invasion of privacy that the
Fourth Amendment had been adopted to prevent.
The wiretapping in Olmstead had uncovered a vast conspiracy to
import, distribute, and sell liquor in violation of the National Prohibition
Act.24 Eight lines connected to phones in the homes and offices of the
defendants had been tapped over the course of five months. 2 5 Agents
listened to the phone conversations, took notes of what they heard, and then
typed their notes.26 Olmstead, the lead defendant, had been caught dead to
rights, so he insisted that police tapping of his phone lines was just as
intrusive as police breaking into his home and seizing his diary without a
search warrant.2 7
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that the Fourth Amendment
had been adopted to "prevent the use of governmental force to search a
man's house, his person, his papers and his effects," not the tapping of
phone lines outside of his home.28
Because the telephone had been invented fifty years earlier and was
already in widespread use in 1928, the Court's holding was disturbing to

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 463-65 (Taft, C.J., majority opinion).
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many. 29 All of a sudden, anyone who used a phone had to expect that calls
could be monitored by government agents irrespective of whether they had
probable cause or a search warrant. The Olmstead decision itself, however,
suggested how the privacy of telephone calls might still be protected. It held:
"Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by
making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation."30
B.

The 1934 Federal Act

Congress did just that by enacting section 605 of the
Communications Act of 1934,31 which stated that "no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance . .. of such intercepted
communication to any person." 32 At the time, this law was interpreted as
prohibiting admission of wiretaps as evidence if none of the parties to
the wire communications had consented.33
Section 605 did not apply to the interception of strictly oral
communications,3 and one reason for that omission may have been that the
technology for electronically or mechanically recording face-to-face
communications was not yet readily available.
The law posed a serious challenge for law enforcement officers who
wished to tap into telephone calls and then use the recordings in court as
admissible evidence. 36 One way to avoid the law was to place hidden
microphones where officers could pick up spoken words without tapping
into telephone lines themselves. 37 This technique allowed agents to
eavesdrop on oral statements of a person speaking into a phone, if not the
person on the other end of the line. And once tape recording equipment
became available, this technique also allowed agents to record at least one
29. The decision infuriated Justice Louis Brandeis who, thirty-eight years earlier, had coauthored a famous law review article espousing his views in favor of privacy. Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). In Olmstead, Brandeis
wrote that the Fourth Amendment "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 465 (Taft, C.J., majority opinion).
31. Act ofJune 19, 1934, ch. 652,48 Stat. 1064, 1103 (1934) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1946)).
32. Id.
33. Nardonne v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
34. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1942).
35. MAGNETIC RECORDING: THE FIRST 100 YEARS 48 (Eric D. Daniel, C. Denis Mee, Mark
H. Clark eds., 1998).
36. Herbert Brownell, Jr., The PublicSecurity & Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 200
(1954) (discussing the invention of magnetic recording in 1928).
37. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32.
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side of a telephone call. The Fourth Amendment would not allow the
placement of microphones in private homes and offices.
But law
enforcement officials felt that microphones placed in public places, such as
on the exterior of public telephone booths, would not run afoul of either the
wiretap law or the Fourth Amendment. 39 Law enforcement officials
wanted to listen in on public telephone booth calls because the caller might
assume once he or she closed the phone booth door, no one would be privy
to the call other than the person on the other end of the line.
C. Chasing Katz
Charles Katz claimed he made that assumption when making calls
from a Los Angeles phone booth to Miami and Boston in violation of
federal gambling laws. 4 0 FBI agents were listening to his conversation
and recorded his every word.41
Katz challenged the recordings as violating his Fourth Amendment
rights.42 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the FBI had played by the
rules set out in Olmstead because it had not physically entered the phone
booth, seized any tangible property, or tapped the phone line. 43 justice
Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, then pulled that rug out,
commenting that "we have since departed from the narrow view on which
the Olmstead rested." 44 He added that the underpinnings of Olmstead had
been eroded, and that the FBI's actions did violate the Fourth
Amendment.45 Thus, a reversal of the conviction was required.4 6
Justice Harlan added a critical concurrence explaining that he
understood the majority's opinion to mean that Fourth Amendment
protection would exist where it could be shown "first that a person have
[sic.] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."A 7 This two-pronged approach would set the standards for
both the Fourth Amendment and statutory privacy protection for decades to
come.48 Justice Harlan agreed that the FBI violated Katz's rights because
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Katz test

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1961).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 353.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-46 (1979) (applying Justice Harlan's
to determine the constitutionality of using a pen register to record dialed numbers).
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he had closed the phone booth door behind him, thus exhibiting a
subjective expectation that third parties would not overhear his
communications.49 Katz was aware, of course, that the person on the
other end of the line would hear what he had to say and might choose to
disclose it to the government. Katz had accepted that risk, but he had not
accepted the risk that unseen agents would be intercepting his oral
communications.
Katz, like the Olmstead opinion before it, set off a firestorm of
controversy. Now, not the law prohibited police from engaging in
warrantless tapping of telephone communications, but they also could not
engage in warrantless and clandestine interception of many oral
communications. Justice Black dissented that eavesdropping carried on by
electronic means simply did not constitute a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.o
Like Olmstead, the Katz decision invited a legislative solution to its
critics. The Court wrote that "a duly authorized magistrate, properly
notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the
basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise
intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with
appropriate safeguards," the search at issue.'
D. The 1968 Federal Act
Congress immediately went to work, passing Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 just one year later. 52 This law,
unlike the 1934 Act, set forth a comprehensive framework for federal
regulation of the interception of both wire and oral communications.53
It carefully distinguished these two types of communications in a
manner that would be sure to outlaw both the third-party wiretapping that
the 1934 Act prohibited, as well as the clandestine eavesdropping on
oral communications that the Katz court found to violate the Fourth
Amendment in Katz. 54 The law also spelled out specific procedures
through which law enforcement officers could apply for and obtain judicial
authorization to intercept and disclose both wire and oral
communications when they had probable cause to do so.55 The law

49. Id.
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 354-55.
52. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 tit. III (1968) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 2510).
53. Id. at § 802 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)-(2)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2516).
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expressly prohibited the admissibility of any wire or oral communications
intercepted in violation of the law as evidence.s6
Congress borrowed the language of Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Katz to define the term "oral communication" as an "oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation." 57 The Act thus excluded any oral statementss8 where the
speaker failed to exhibit an expectation that his words would not be
intercepted, or any oral statements made under circumstances that would
not justify such an expectation, even though the communication would, in a
lay sense, still be an oral communication.5 9
The Act defined the term "intercept" to mean "the aural acquisition of
the content of any wire or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device," 6 0 but excluded ordinary
telephone equipment provided to a subscriber by telephone companies
in the ordinary course of business from the definition of "electronic,
mechanical, or other device." 61
The Act also included a provision that it would "not be unlawful . . for
a person ... to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person
is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception." 62 This provision meant that
even when a person exhibited an expectation of privacy in an oral
communication, and the circumstances would justify that expectation,
interception using a hidden device and without consent would be allowed
as long as the person intercepting the communication was a party to it.
The following example illustrates of how this would work. Friend A
says to Friend B either in person or on a telephone call: "I have something
to tell you but please swear you will not tell a soul." Friend B responds: "I
swear on my mother's life that I will take your secret to my grave. What is
your secret?" Under these circumstances, Friend A has exhibited an
expectation that the secret he is about to tell will not be recorded or
disclosed to others. Yet, Friend B is carrying a small recorder in his
pocket or attaches a recording device to his phone, turns it on, and records

56. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2515).
57. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)).
58. The term "oral statements" refers to all forms of oral statements, whereas the term "oral
communications" solely refers to oral statements which are restricted by chapter 934.
59. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 tit. III (1968) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 2510).
60. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4)).
61. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)).
62. Id. (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)).
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Friend A when he says: "I just murdered my wife." Friend B surrenders
the recording to police, confident that police will arrest Friend A for
murder and not Friend B for making the recording. The fact that Friend A
admitted to committing a serious crime may have given Friend B
confidence that his recording and disclosure were legally justified, but the
reality is that the recording was lawful merely because Friend B was a
party to the oral statement.
The operation of the statute in this fashion was of great practical
importance because Friend B could not have known the secret that Friend
A was about to convey. If the federal law allowed a party to record oral
statements secretly only if the statements disclosed criminal acts, Friend B
would not know whether he could secretly record the statement until its
contents had been disclosed to him, and, at that point, it would be too late
to record the disclosure. The exclusion ensured that Friend B could turn on
his secret recorder and his interception of Friend A's communication
would be lawful, irrespective of whether Friend A disclosed that he had
murdered his wife or that he had purchased his wife a new car.
Under this regime, every telephone call would be protected solely
against third-party interception without a search warrant. Also, any strictly
oral statement would be protected against interception without a search
warrant only when the speaker exhibited an expectation that his or her
words would not be intercepted and the circumstances justified this
expectation. All oral statements without a justifiable expectation of privacy
would be fair game for third-party interception, and so would any
statement, whether by wire or oral, by any party to the statement.
E. States Copy the Federal Law
But the federal law did not provide a solution for state law enforcement
officials who also wanted to engage in electronic eavesdropping. They
needed a law that provided procedures to obtain judicial authorization for
that sort of interception. Florida, like many other states, adopted such a
law one year after the federal law was enacted, and it closely followed the
federal law. 63 Florida defined the term "oral communication" to mean only
an oral communication "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that
such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
The Florida law prohibited willful
justifying such expectation." 6 4
interception, use or disclosure of wire and oral communications, 6 5 and it

§§

63. Act of May 15, 1969, ch. 17, 1969 Fla. Laws at 29 (codified as FLA. STAT.
934.01-10 (1969)).
64. Id. at § 2(2) (codified as FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2)).
65. Id. at § 3 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 934.03).
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made it lawful for a person to intercept wire or oral communications
"where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing a
criminal act." 66 The Florida law also contained a provision similar to a
provision in the federal act, which prohibited the use of communications
intercepted in violation of the law as evidence.6 7
The structure of both the federal and state laws, employing definitions
that were inconsistent with lay definitions of terms and double negatives to
inform citizens of what was "not unlawful," made them difficult to
understand and apply. Yet, they were clear enough to make certain that
any party to a wire or oral statement could use a hidden or undisclosed
device to record the statement.
Even with both federal and state statutes in place, a question remained
as to whether the Fourth Amendment might prohibit law enforcement
officials from engaging in one activity that the laws expressly allowed: use
of a body bug to transmit oral statements to others whom the unsuspecting
speaker could not see.6 8 Statutory authorization of such interception could
not override Fourth Amendment restrictions on warrantless government
searches and seizures. The scenario of a government agent carrying a body
bug was slightly different from both the wiretap in Olmstead and the phone
booth bug in Katz, and it did not take long for a test case to arrive at the
Supreme Court.
F. A Body Bug in White's Home
In connection with a mid-1960s investigation, law enforcement agents
69
placed a hidden transmitter on Harvey Jackson, a government informant.
Jackson then had eight conversations with James A. White-four of them
in Jackson's home, and the remaining four in White's home, Jackson's car,
and a restaurant. 7 0
White incriminated himself and was charged with several federal drug
offenses.7 1 When the case proceeded to trial, Jackson could not be found,
so the prosecutor instead introduced the testimony of the agents who had
listened remotely to the discussions via Jackson's hidden transmitter.72

66. Id. at § 3(2)(d) (codified as FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d)).
67. Id. at § 6 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 934.06).
68. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 tit. III (1968) (codified as
18 U.S.C. § 2510).
69. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971).
70. Id. at 747.
71. Id. at 746-47.
72. Id. at 747.
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White objected that this type of electronic surveillance violated his Fourth
Amendment rights in exactly the same way that the FBI had violated
The district court overruled the objection and the jury
Katz's rights.
74
convicted White. The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed. The court rejected the government's attempt to
distinguish Katz on the grounds that the FBI had intercepted Katz's
conversation without consent or knowledge of any party to the
conversation, whereas the government intercepted White's conversation
with the consent of Jackson who was a party to the conversation.7 6 The
critical similarity which the court found in both cases, the government had
listened in on a conversation without the consent of the person against
whom the evidence would be introduced.
A four-justice plurality of the United States Supreme Court came to a
different conclusion. It found that placing a bug on a person was different
from placing a bug on the outside of a phone booth because, in the former
case, the speaker was aware that he was speaking with someone who might
disclose the communications to the government. 7 7 Justice White, writing
for the plurality, pointed out that the Court had held in an earlier case that
the Fourth Amendment is not violated when an undercover government
agent infiltrates a criminal organization, writes down what he hears, and
then testifies against the organizations members in court.78 Justice White
wrote:
[for] constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the
agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his
conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records
them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his
person, (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously
transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located
elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting
frequency.
He explained that the defendant could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy given the risk that Jackson himself would disclose

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1969) (en banc), rev'd, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Id. at 842-43.
Id.
White, 401 U.S. at 750-51 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 283 (1966)).
Id.
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the confidential communications.80 He added that one contemplating
illegal activities takes the risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police.81 He also cautioned against erecting "constitutional barriers to
relevant and probative evidence which is also accurate and reliable." 82
The White plurality opinion firmly embraced the principle that while
one who is speaking face-to-face with another person might have a
subjective expectation that the other person would not disclose the contents
of the communication, that expectation could not be considered
reasonable. This principle was not limited by the nature of the contents of
the communication or the location of the communication; it simply
recognized that when a person speaks directly to another, there is always a
significant risk that the other person would disclose what was discussed.84
The Court went further and reasoned that because no expectation of
this nature could be justifiable, the face-to-face speaker could not have a
justifiable expectation that the person to whom he was speaking was not
using a hidden device to record the conversation.8 5
This ruling
effectively meant that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the recently
enacted federal and state laws prohibited the secret recording of face-toface oral communication by a party to the communication.
The rationale
of this ruling has been applied with equal force to secret recording of
telephone calls because the person being recorded would know of the
risk that the person on the other end could disclose the contents of the
call from memory or notes, rendering any expectation that the call
would not be recorded by that person using an electronic or mechanical

device unjustifiable.
80.
81.
82.
view he

Id at 751.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753. Justice Black concurred in White, creating a majority for adhering to the
expressed in Katz that electronic surveillance is simply not a search or seizure. Id.
83. Id. at 751-54.
84. White, 401 U.S. at 750-51.

85. Id. at 751.
86. In a subsequent decision, United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its position in White that undercover agents carrying radio equipment which
transmitted the conversations with a suspect to either a recording equipment or to officers
monitoring the transmitting frequency do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that
"[n]either the Constitution nor any Act of Congress requires that official approval be secured
before conversations are overheard or recorded by Government agents with the consent of one of
the conversants." Id. at 744 (citation omitted). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963) (holding the Fourth Amendment provided no protection to an individual against the
recording of his statements by the IRS agent to whom he was speaking).
87. See, e.g., Marietta v. Macomb Cnty. Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 276 n.5 (6th Cir.
1998) ("[N]either the United States Constitution nor any federal statute prohibits law enforcement
officials from recording or listening to phone conversations so long as one of the parties to the
conversation has consented."); United States v. McKneely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 1995)
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The White decision is important for purposes of understanding the
federal and state laws that had been enacted in the wake of Katz because
they used Justice Harlan's language from Katz to distinguish "oral
communications" protected by the act from those not protected." After
White, neither the federal act, the parallel state laws, nor the Fourth
Amendment could be regarded as prohibiting the secret recording of any
oral communication by a party to the communication because the speaker
could not have a justifiable expectation that the intercepting party would
not record, use or disclose it.
For journalists, police, and ordinary citizens, the Court's decision
worked in their favor. They could record their own calls and in-person
conversations without consent, and, in those unusual circumstances where
probable cause could be shown, they could seek and obtain judicial
approval for a wiretap or hidden bug.
IV. Florida Law
A. The Florida Wrench
The Florida legislature threw a wrench into all of this in 1974 when
something motivated it to amend chapter 934 to expressly allow
interception of wire and oral communications only if all parties
consented to the interception.89 This amendment90 would cast Florida
with a minority of states to have such a restrictive statute. 91
Since 1969, Florida's chapter 934, like its federal counterpart, had
provided: "It is not unlawful . . for a person . .. to intercept wire or oral
communications when such person is a party to the communication or
when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to

("[W]hen the government records a defendant's conversation with another party, pursuant to that
party's consent, neither the Fourth Amendment nor 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) is violated.").
88. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), and
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1969) with FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1969).
89. Lucy Ware Morgan, a legendary statehouse writer for the St. PetersburgTimes tried to
find out what motivated the change in 2005 when Jim DeFede, a Miami Herald reporter, was
charged with violating chapter 934 for recording his conversation with former Miami City
Commissioner, Art Teele, shortly before Teele committed suicide. See Lucy Morgan, Forgotten
Tape Law Takes Down a Journalist, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at 4B col. 1.
According to the article, "DeFede had been sympathetic to Teele and started his tape recorder
when he realized how distraught Teele was." Id. Because DeFede admitted recording Teele
without consent, Miami Herald fired DeFede and the State Attorney considered prosecuting him.
Id. Morgan wanted to know why Florida even had a law that prohibited the recording. Id.
90. Act of June 19, 1974 ch. 74-249, 1974 Fla. Laws (amending FLA. STAT. § 934.04(2)(d)
(1972 Supp.)).
91.

REPORTERS' COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 1.

94

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

[37:1

such interception." 92 The amendment changed the law to state: "It is
lawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire or oral
communication when all of the parties to the communication have given
prior consent to such interception." 93 The amendment effectively narrowed
the scope of the exclusion that had previously existed from the ban on
interception of wire and oral communications. Now, a party to a wire or
oral communication could no longer intercept it simply because one was a
party to it. Interception would be lawful only if all parties consented, the
communication fell outside of the definitions of wire and oral
communications, or prior judicial approval had been obtained.94 In Order
to prevent this amendment from interfering with law enforcement, the
amendment also revised the statute to provide that it is lawful for a law
enforcement officer or a person acting under the direction of a law
enforcement officer "to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication when such person is a party to the communication or
one of the parties to the communications has given prior consent to such
interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence
of a criminal act." 9 5 This aspect of the 1974 amendment squarely
targeted the law at journalists and ordinary citizens who recorded their
telephone calls.9 6
This amendment, however, did nothing to change the fact that oral
communication would continue to be defined as an "oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation."97 The definition of "oral communication" was not expanded,
it should have remained clear that secret recordings by a party to an oral
statement, whether a law enforcement officer or anyone else, would be
lawful. As in White, the person whose statement was being intercepted
could not have a justifiable expectation that another person would interrupt
the statement. The 1974 amendment prohibited the secret recording of a

92. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1972 Supp.).
93. Act of June 19, 1974 ch. 74-249, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws (codified as FLA. STAT. §
934.03(2)(d)) (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., State v. News-Press Pub. Co., 338 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that interception of a wire communication without the consent of all parties was illegal).
95. Ch. 74-249 § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 694 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 943.03(2)(c)).
96. Operation of the law in this fashion is demonstrated by cases such as Atkins v.
State, 930 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), which held that the alleged victim of a sexual
assault had violated chapter 934 when she secretly recorded her telephone conversation with
a witness.
97. While the amendment left the basic definition of "oral communication" unchanged, it
clarified that the term "does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting."
Act ofJune 19, 1974 ch. 249, § 1, 1974 Fla. Laws (codified as FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2)).
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"wire communication" by a party to the call because the definition of "wire
communication," unlike the definition of "oral communication," did not
include an exclusion of communications based on expectations of
privacy.98

B. The Press Misfires and Misleads
Shortly after the Florida legislature enacted, Sunbeam Television
Corporation and the Miami Herald Publishing argued that the 1974
amendment violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to
gather information.9 9
Recording of telephone calls and in-person
interviews were regarded as critical tools of the trade, and prohibiting their
use unless the source expressly consented, was regarded as effectively
banning their use.' 00 The Florida Supreme Court rebuffed the challenge in
Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., holding that "[t]his was a policy
decision by the Florida legislature to allow each party to a conversation to
have an expectation of privacy from interception by another party to the
0 The decision made no attempt to determine whether the
conversation."o'
1974 amendment impacted both wire communications and oral
communications in the same way. It simply held that whatever the impact
might be, it did not run afoul of the First Amendment.10 2
The court's treatment of the amendment as impacting wire and oral
communications in the same way sowed confusion in three subsequent
criminal cases: State v. Walls,103 State v. Tsavaris,104 and State v. Sarmiento.'s
In Walls, the facts were similar to those in White, except that the person
who made the recording, Francis Antel, was not acting under the direction
of a law enforcement officer. Antel believed the defendants were extorting
him, so he secretly recorded them when they came to his home to deliver
the threat in person.1 0 6 The defendants argued that the recordings violated
98. The prohibition on interception of wire communications without the consent of all
parties is tempered to some degree by FLA. STAT. § 934.02(4), which excludes equipment
furnished by a provider of phone service and used in the ordinary course of business from the
definition of "electronic, mechanical, or other device." The definition--dubbed the "business
extension exception"-has been interpreted to allow businesses to record customer calls without
consent. Royal Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 215, 217 (11th
Cir. 1991); Stalley v. ADS Alliance Data Sys., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-1652-T-33TBM, 2014 WL
349489 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2014).
99. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 724-26 (Fla. 1977).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 726-27.
102. Id.
103. State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).
104. State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981).
105. State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
106. Walls, 356 So. 2d at 295.
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chapter 934, and should have been turned away because the threats did not
constitute an "oral communication" within the statutory definition of
section 934.02(2), which excluded oral statements where an expectation of
privacy could not be justified. 0 7 Such an expectation could not have been
justifiable under these facts because the oral statements, just like the oral
statements in White, had been delivered to the person making the recording,
and that person was free to disclose those statements to anyone.
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court gave no consideration to the
United States Supreme Court's conclusion in White that a person cannot
have a justifiable expectation that another party to the communication will
not intercept and disclose the statement. 0 8 Instead, it relied on Shevin
and repeated the error from that decision by reading chapter 934 to
prohibit interception of both oral and wire communications unless all
parties consented or a judge approved.1 09 Although the court in Shevin
had not expressly stated that its holding would apply in the context of
face-to-face conversations, the court in Walls concluded that Shevin
applied in this situation.
Walls also relied on Markham v. Markham"o for its conclusion, even
though Markham involved interception by a person who was not a party to
the communication, and on Katz, which also involved interception by a
nonparty to the communication."1 ' The court made no mention of White,
because White addressed the Fourth Amendment while Walls addressed
chapter 934. Nevertheless, White should have been regarded as both
instructive and dispositive because the language of chapter 934's definition
of oral communications had been copied directly from the definition of that
term found in the federal law, and that federal definition came straight from
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz explaining which oral statements
would fall within the definition of oral communications. White made it
clear that in-person oral statements would not constitute oral
communications.
Although the Walls decision was plainly wrong, at least it did not
require the Florida Supreme Court to free criminals who were caught redhanded. The court pointed out that "no harm derives from the suppression
of the tape recording since the victim is free to testify as to the alleged
extortionary threats."ll 2 While this aspect of the case may have made it
easier for the court to reach its flawed holding, its conclusion that chapter
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 296.
Id. (quoting Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 727 (1971)).

110.

Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973).

111.
112.

Walls, 356 So. 2d at 296-97.
Id. at 297.
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934 requires suppression of intercepted statements where the speaker had
no justifiable expectation of privacy should have caused the court to
wonder whether its interpretation of the statute was correct. If the victim
could testify to the extortionate threats, then how could the defendants have
had a justifiable expectation that their threats were not being intercepted by
the victim with a recorder or transmitter?
In its next chapter 934 case, Tsavaris, the Florida Supreme Court
reached the right result, but used an overly broad justification for doing so,
and perpetuated the perception that all parties must consent to the
interception of any wire communication or oral statement. In that case, a
sheriff's detective was meeting with a medical examiner to inform him that
a doctor was suspected of murdering one of his patients. During the
meeting, the doctor called the medical examiner to inquire about the
patient's autopsy results.' 13 The medical examiner placed the call on a
speakerphone and turned on a recording device. 1 14 Since a portion of the
statement had been made through the telephone, the statement constituted a
"wire communication."' 15 This precluded treatment of the interception as
lawful under the rationale of the White decision because the definition of
''wire communication," unlike the definition of "oral communication," did
not exclude statements where the person failed to exhibit an expectation
that the statement would not be subject to interception or the circumstances
could not justify such an expectation.' 16
Instead of analyzing the case in this way, the Florida Supreme Court
researched the legislative history and found that Representative Jack
Shreve made this statement on the House floor: "' [The operation of this
bill] is to prevent, make it illegal, for a person to record a conversation,
17
even though he's a party to it, without the other person's consent.,,'
The effect of the 1974 amendment was actually much narrower, however,
since it had not brought within the definition of "oral communication" an
oral statement, such as the statements in White where the speaker was
addressing face-to-face the person intercepting the statement.
Both Walls and Tsavaris showed that the Florida Supreme Court
intended to curtail increasingly aggressive efforts by law enforcement to

113.

State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).

114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
"Wire communication" had been defined as "any communication made in whole or in part

through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other

like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any
person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of
intrastate, interstate or foreign communications." FLA. STAT. § 934.02(1) (1979).
117. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2dat422.
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gather information. A broad interpretation of chapter 934 was consistent
with this approach. The court went even further down this road in
Sarmiento," and held that article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution
provided even broader protection against searches and seizure than the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In Sarmiento, a detective had arranged to meet a man at his mobile
home to purchase heroin.11 9 The detective, equipped with a hidden
electronic body bug, arrived at the mobile home, was invited inside, and
bought the drugs.1 20 Two law enforcement officers monitored the
conversations inside the home from outside.121 The facts of this case were
thus almost exactly the same as those in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in White, which had concluded this type of investigative
activity does not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 2 2 The Florida Supreme
Court ruled that the Florida Constitution gave Floridians broader rights, and
ordered the suppression of the evidence acquired through the body bug.1 23
The court reached the outer limits of its embrace of privacy rights the
following year in Morningstar v. State 24 when it declined to extend the
holding of Sarmiento to prohibit law enforcement officers from using body
bugs to intercept oral communications in the business office of a
suspect. The court explained that its ruling in Sarmiento was based on the
fact that an undercover police officer had intercepted communications in
the defendant's own home and that the home is "an area specifically
protected by Florida's constitution." 2 5 By the date of this ruling, the
Florida legislature and voters had had enough of the court's restrictions on
law enforcement, and amended article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution in 1982 to state: "This right shall be construed in conformity
with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court."' 2 6 This amendment effectively
overruled Sarmiento and prevented any further expansion of constitutional
118.

State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).

119. Id. at 644.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
123. Justice James Alderman dissented in Sarmiento on the basis that the Florida Supreme
Court should have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in White and held that
the defendants could not have had a justifiable expectation that their conversations were not
being intercepted because the person intercepting the conversation was a party to the
conversation. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d at 646 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
124. Morningstar v. State, 428 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1982).
125. Id. at 221. In Hill v. State, 422 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1982), the Florida Supreme Court
refused to extend Sarmiento to prohibit interception of oral communications in the
defendant's backyard.
126. Fla. H. Jt. Res. 31-H (1982) (enacted).
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protection against search and seizure. The amendment meant that if
detectives could persuade suspects to invite them into their homes, they
could wire themselves up and intercept all of the oral statements directed at
them without prior judicial approval.
C. The Gushing of Blood
There remained, however, the pesky problem of chapter 934,
which Walls mistakenly interpreted to prohibit the use of body bugs by
persons not acting under the direction of law enforcement agents. 127
State v. Inciarranol2 8 provided the Florida Supreme Court with an
opportunity to address that problem. Anthony Paul Inciarrano entered the
office of one of his business associate, discussed a business deal in which
his associate no longer wanted a part, and then shot and killed the associate
in premeditated fashion. 12 9 The victim had had the foresight to install a
hidden tape recorder in his office desk and recorded the whole transaction,
including the conversation about the deal, the sound of a gun being cocked,
five shots being fired by Inciarrano, the groans of the victim, the gushing of
blood, and the victim falling from his chair.' 30 Inciarrano moved to
suppress the recording, claiming that it had been made without his consent
in violation of chapter 934, and that the court's decisions in Walls and
Tsavaris mandated this result. The granting of this motion, unlike the
granting of the motion in Walls, would be far from harmless to the state
because the only witness who had heard Inciarrano's incriminating
admissions in person was the deceased victim.
In response, the Florida Supreme Court could have acknowledged that
Walls was a mistake, and ruled that any expectation Inciarrano had that
his voice was not being intercepted was unjustifiable because his oral
statements had been directed to the person who was doing the
interception. Such a conclusion would have been consistent with the
principle established in White that had been incorporated into the 1968
federal statute, that had been used in the Florida statute in 1969, that had
been unchanged by the 1974 amendment to the Florida statute, and that the
1982 amendment to the Florida Constitution had required the court to
accept as a constitutional principle.
Instead, the court tried to distinguish the prior cases. "In neither Walls
nor Tsavaris," Justice Alderman wrote for the majority, "did we address the
requirement of section 934.02(2) that there be a reasonable expectation of

127.
128.
129.
130.

State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).
State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 1273-74.
Id. at 1274.
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privacy in the oral communication in order for it to be protected under the
security of communication statute."l 31 Although this may have been true, it
was not apparent from those decisions that the court had not made such a
determination in those cases.
Justice Alderman noted that "oral
communication," as used in the statute meant only an oral communication
made with an exhibited expectation the communication would not be
intercepted. Under circumstances justifying the expectation, Justice
Alderman wrote that whatever expectation Inciarrano may have had, it
would not have been justifiable because "Inciarrano went to the victim's
office with the intent to do harm. He did not go as a patient." 1 32
This observation seemed to make sense. If a man is murdering his
victim, it would be logical to conclude that he could not have a justifiable
expectation that his victim was not recording him. On the other hand,
treating chapter 934 as not prohibiting interceptions of oral statements only
when the speaker is committing a crime would be similar to treating the
Fourth Amendment as not barring any search and seizure so long as it
produces evidence of a crime. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that this type of a rule would not provide much security against
police searches because the ends could justify the means.133 If chapter 934
can effectively protect any oral statements at all, it must be applied based
on the circumstances creating a justifiable expectation that the statements
were not being recorded-not on whether the statements themselves
revealed illegal activity or took place in a non-private setting.
Justice Ehrlich, concurring in the Inciarrano result, recognized this
problem and wrote that the outcome should have been based simply on the
fact that Inciarrano was speaking to the person making the recording. 13 4
Echoing the United States Supreme Court's approach since White, he
wrote, "when one speaks to another, even in circumstances in which one
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the speaker intends that the hearer
received and thereafter has no control over the hearer's dissemination of
that speech." 35 He added that "[h]ere, the victim was the intended
recipient of the conversation with the alleged murderer.

. .

.

Once the

131. Id. at 1275. The assertion that neither Walls nor Tsavaris addressed section 934.02(2)'s
requirement that there be a reasonable expectation of privacy in oral communications is
contradicted by those decisions. In Walls, the court expressly held that the communication fell
within the definition of oral communication under section 934.02(2). Walls, So. 2d at 296. The
Tsavaris decision does not expressly address this issue. The court appears to assume that the
communication at issue fell within the definition of "oral communication" and then expressly
addressed whether the communication had been "intercepted" in a prohibited manner.
132. Inciarrano,473 So. 2d at 1275.
133. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (announcing the exclusionary rule).
134. Inciarrano,473 So. 2d at 1276-77 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
135. Id.
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conversation was directed to him, it was in his possession, whether through

memory or recording."l 36
Since Justice Alderman had dissented in Sarmiento, one might have
expected him to go along with Justice Ehrlich and overrule Sarmiento and
hold that chapter 934 does not prohibit the use of hidden recorders by a
party to a communication of any type. Instead, his opinion seemed to
depend on the fact that Inciarrano had been caught in the act of committing
a crime in a location where he could not have much, if any, expectation of
privacy. Justice Ehrlich's concurrence, joined by Justice Shaw, also fueled
the idea that any expectation of privacy is lost when the substance of the
communication discloses illegal conduct by the speaker. He posed the
rhetorical question: "Why were Walls' privacy rights not 'dissolved' by
his extortionate threats?"'3 7 This aspect of the decision continued to focus
subsequent decisions on the content of the communication and the location
of the communication, rather than on the simple issue of whether the
communication was directed to the person who secretly recorded it.13 s
D. A Body Bug in Hume's Bedroom

State v. Hume'39 should have done away with any perception that
location mattered because it duplicated the facts of White, and held police
had not violated article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution when
they used a body bug on an undercover officer invited into the
defendant's bedroom to intercept without consent or warrant the
defendant's statements to the officer.
The Florida Supreme Court
recognized the recent amendment to article I, section 12, as overruling
Sarmiento, and the court expressly adopted the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in White that any expectation that a party to whom the

136. Id.
137. Id. at 1277.
138. See Migut v. Flynn, 131 F. App'x 262, 265 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that location is a
significant factor); Cohen Bros., LLC v. ME Corp., S.A., 872 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004) ("[W]e don't believe that society would recognize, as reasonable, that ... an expectation of
privacy exists in a conference call, specifically where the call is held to conduct the business of
the company"); Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
alleged victim did not violate chapter 934 when he secretly recorded an attorney communicating
an extortionate threat in a meeting at the alleged victim's office); Stevenson v. State, 667 So. 2d
410, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("A significant factor used in determining the reasonableness
of the defendant's expectation of privacy in a conversation is the location in which the
conversation or communication occurs"); Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Edwards, 654
So. 2d 628, 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that a subordinate officer did not violate
chapter 934 when he secretly recorded his conversation with his supervisors because the
supervisors had no subjective expectation of privacy considering the number of officers present
and the disciplinary nature of the interview).
139. State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987).
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oral communication is directed would not be intercepting the
communication is not justifiable. 140
But Hume did not address whether chapter 934 itself prohibited this
type of interception even if the state constitution did not because the
interceptor in Hume was a law enforcement officer, and the 1974
amendment expressly allowed law enforcement officers to intercept to
obtain evidence of a criminal act. 14 1 In State v. Smith,1 4 2 the Florida
Supreme Court held the nature of the location might itself extinguish a
reasonable expectation that an oral communication was not being recorded;
but again, the court did not have to decide whether a private party's secret
recording of an oral statement in a private location, such as the bedroom of
the person being recorded, would violate chapter 934. In Smith, Robert
Smith had been riding as a passenger in a car on 1-95 when police pulled it
over for driving erratically. 143 Police asked Smith and the driver to sit in
the back seat of a police car while the officers conducted a consent search
of the suspect's car. 14 4 The police also took the opportunity to secretly
record Smith and the driver while they pondered their situation.1 45 Their
pondering included incriminating admissions, and the two were charged
with crimes.14 6 They challenged their convictions on both article I, section
12, and chapter 934 grounds.1 4 7 The Florida Supreme Court rejected both
challenges, holding that "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a
police car." 4 8 No police officer had been a party to the communications
between Smith and the driver, so the decision had to rest on location rather
than the participation of the interceptor in the communication. This focus
on location left open the possibility that chapter 934 might be read to
prohibit interception in more private locations by private actors, even if
the person making the recording was a party to the communication, and
even if neither the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 12 nor chapter 934
would prohibit the interception by undercover law enforcement officers.1 4 9

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 187-88.
FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1972 Supp.).
State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 851.

148. Smith, 641 So. 2d at 852.
149. The court of appeals in La Porte v. State, 512 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), also
did not have to decide this issue because the interceptor was not a party to the communications.
The interceptor hid a video and audio recorder in his studio to capture models changing clothes.
Id. at 986.
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A Body Bug in Lawyers' and Doctors' Offices

The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed this issue in HorningKeating v. State,150 a workers' compensation fraud case. There, Louise
Rothstein, a care provider for Barney Dreggors, acting pursuant to
directions of an insurance carrier, secretly recorded her conversations with
Dreggors and his wife, with the couple's attorney, Faith Horning-Keating,
in the attorney's office.' 5 ' Rothstein then provided the tapes to a police
officer.1 52 The rationale of White and Hume should have been applied here
to hold that the Dreggors could not have had a justified expectation that
Rothstein was not intercepting their oral communications because they had
been directed specifically at Rothstein. Instead, the State admitted the
tapes had been made by Rothstein in violation of chapter 934 and should be
suppressed under section 934.06.153 The court, not content with the
concession, added its own gratuitous analysis that the facts led
"inescapably to the conclusion that this conduct violates Ms. Keating's
protected privacy rights and the provisions of Chapter 934,"154 noting that
the facts of this case were analogous to those in Katz. Yet, that was a
flawed analogy. In Katz, the United States Supreme Court had found a
Fourth Amendment violation because the agents who listened through the
device attached to the phone booth were not parties to the interception
Rothstein, on the other hand, was a party to the
in that case.155
communication she recorded. 156 The court of appeals neither cited nor
discussed White or Hume. If these cases had been given consideration, it
seems likely that the court would have reached a different result.
Brugmann v. State 5 7 provided yet another opportunity for a Florida
appellate court to clarify whether chapter 934 was consistent with state
and federal search and seizure decisions, such as White and Hume.
Similar to Horning-Keating, a five-judge majority of the en banc Third
District Court of Appeal chose to affirm summarily a trial court's order,
which held that the secret recording of a lawyer in his office violated
chapter 934.158
Judge Rothenberg penned a strongly worded dissent in Brugmann
and provided a clear recitation of the facts from which the case arose. She
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Homing-Keating v. State, 777 So. 2d 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 440, 447.
Id at 447.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Horning-Keating, 777 So. 2d at 440, 447.
Brugmann v. State, 117 So. 3d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 40.
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explained that meetings took place between Sean Casey, a man charged
with DUI manslaughter; his mother; Casey's lawyer, Milton Hirsch; and a
psychologist working with Hirsch, Michael Rappaport.' 5 9 Casey claimed
that Hirsch and Rappaport had advised him, while he was free on bond and
awaiting trial, to flee the country to avoid prosecution even though Casey
insisted he was innocent. 16 0 Casey also claimed that a secret tape had been
made of Hirsch and Rappaport providing this advice when he later brought
his mother to meet with Hirsch first, so that his mother could hear the
recommendations herself and help Casey decide whether he should flee or
face trial. 161

Casey ultimately fled, was apprehended in South America, returned
to Florida to face trial, and pled guilty both to the original DUI charge and
to a new charge of failure to appear while on bond. 16 2 He received stiff
sentences on both counts. 16 3 Soon afterward, Casey retained a new lawyer
and moved to vacate his plea.'1
Casey argued Hirsch had unethically
pushed him to plead guilty in order to prevent the state from learning of
the advice that he and the psychologist had given Casey to flee the country.
After the new lawyer's attempt to set aside the conviction failed,
Casey, acting pro se, filed a further motion to vacate the plea accompanied
by transcripts of what he claimed to be the secretly recorded tapes of
Hirsch and Rappaport.165 The prosecution asked the court to seal the
transcripts of the recordings and the recordings themselves on grounds that
they had been made in violation of chapter 934. This statute not only
provided that they were inadmissible, but also prohibited disclosure of their
contents. 166 The trial court granted the motion over the objection of Casey
and members of press interveners, including Bruce Brugmann, a California
publisher.167 The trial judge explained that he had reviewed the tape of
Hirsch, and it did not contain evidence of criminal actions by Hirsch.168
The trial judge further concluded that the making of the recording violated
chapter 934 and, therefore, chapter 934 prohibited anyone from disclosing
its contents. 16 9 The trial court ordered the recording sealed and enjoined
159. Id. (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 41.
161. Id. at 41-42.
162. Id.
163. Brugmann, 117 So. 3d at 41-42.
164. Id. at 40-41.
165. Id. at 45.
166. Id.
167. The author represented both Casey and the press intervenors in opposing the state's
motion to seal.
168. State v. Casey, Nos. FO1-7975 & F06-32686, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2009).
169. Id.
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the disclosure of its contents.170 The trial court did not review the contents
of the Rappaport recording, but ordered it sealed and prohibited the
disclosure of its contents as well. 7 1
Brugmann was another case in which secret recordings had been made
in the private office of an attorney ostensibly by the person or persons to
whom the attorney's oral communications had been directed and without
the direction of a law enforcement officer.1 7 2 Brugmann appealed the
decision and argued that neither the lawyer nor the psychologist could have
had a justifiable expectation that their client or his mother was not
intercepting their oral advice and, thus, the secret taping was lawful. The
appellate court agreed to decide the case en banc, and then summarily
affirmed without explanation.' 73 Judge Rothenberg took it upon herself,
with the concurrence of two other judges, to explain why the majority had
been dead wrong in affirming the order.
She began with the first prong of Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence,
explaining that neither Hirsch nor Rappaport had a subjective
expectation that their oral statements were not being intercepted
because Casey and his mother were free to disclose whatever the lawyer or
psychologist had said to them.1 74 Although the judge cited neither
White nor Hume, her reasoning was similar to the rationale of those
decisions. Her approach was different only in that the White and Hume
decisions had rested on Harlan's second prong-that the defendants were
speaking directly to the persons who intercepted the communicationrather than an analysis of subjective expectations.
Judge Rothenberg could have stopped once she concluded that the
lawyer and psychologist lacked a subjective expectation of privacy as
required by Harlan's first prong. Instead, she went on to consider Harlan's
second prong and confronted the confusing amalgam of state cases that had
been spawned by Inciarrano'sreliance on the location and contents of the
communication. 1" None of the decisions had seized on the simple point

170.
171.
172.

Id.
Brugmann, 117 So. 3d at 45-46.
Neither Casey nor his mother admitted that they had made the recordings. See generally

id. at 41-43.

173. Prior to the en banc ruling, a three-judge panel denied review without opinion and
then, on motion for reconsideration, concluded that it could not review whether chapter 934
had been violated. The panel came to this conclusion because the same issue had been raised
and passed upon without opinion in an earlier appeal. Brugmann v. State, No. 3DO9-2540,
2012 WL 1484102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), vacated, 117 So. 3d 39 (en banc). The panel
relied on Tsavaris and Walls for this conclusion, even though the cases were overruled by
Inciarranoand neither had addressed the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 20-21.
174. Brugmann, 17 So. 3d at 47 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
175. Id.
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made in White and Hume that when a person is speaking directly to another
person, the former cannot reasonably expect that his or her words are not
being intercepted by the other person. Judge Rothenberg noted that the
many cases wrestling with the Florida statute had relied on "an analysis of
the location where the communication took place; the manner in which it
was made; the nature, contents, and purpose of the communication; the
intent of the speaker; and the conduct of the parties."' 76 So it was logical,
she continued, that all of these factors should be taken into account. She
concluded that because the trial judge had not considered the contents of
one of the tape recordings at issue, reversal was required so that the
contents of the tape could be weighed with all of the other factors.1
The concurring and dissenting opinions in the McDade decision
rendered just five days before the Brugmann decision laid bare the
difficulties that this type of multifactor analysis would cause for trial judges
and litigants.
Judge Altenbernd delineated five distinct reasons that the multi-factor
test might not be appropriate. First, the test appeared to impose a burden
on the defendant to prove his innocence in order to prevent the tapes from
being admitted against him.178 Second, the test had its roots in Inciarrano,
and that decision appeared to have been driven by the "bad fact" that the
suppression would have required reversal of a murder conviction. 179 Third,
the test seemed to undermine the desire of the 1974 legislature to stop
secret recordings other than when all parties consented. 80
Fourth,
Inciarrano had based its conclusions on Fourth Amendment case law.' 8
Fifth, the 1974 amendment had been adopted prior to innovations, such as
smart phones and MP3 players that make interception of oral
communications easy and common, so a strict interpretation of the
amendment would make many Floridians criminals.' 82
All five of these factors do show that the multi-prong approach is
unworkable.1 83 More important, however, is that such an approach shows

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 61.
McDade v. State, 114 So. 3d 465, 472 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
Id. at 472-73.

180. Id. at 473.
181. Id. at 474.
182. Id. at 474-75.
183. One Florida trial judge quickly embraced this proposition. State v. Loor, No. F1027774, 20 Fla. L. Weekly 1055a (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 11, 2013) (Hirsch, J.) (order granting
prosecution's motion to suppress). In Loor, the defendant had surreptitiously tape-recorded his
conversation with his ex-wife and her mother in the back of his ex-wife's home. He wanted to
use the tape's recorded conversation to defend against a charge that he had sexually assaulted his
twelve-year-old daughter. The trial judge distinguished Inciarrano on the theory that an accused
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the effectiveness and simplicity of the White and Hume approaches, which
allow interception by anyone to whom an oral communication is directed.
The multi-prong approach imposes no burden on a defendant to
demonstrate innocence in a criminal trial because suppression would not be
required, even if the defendant proved innocence. As such, Inciarranowas
decided correctly even without reliance on the contents or location of the
intercepted statements. That decision does not undermine the intention of
the 1974 legislature, and is fully consistent with its objective of requiring
all-party consent for interception of wire communications by persons not
acting under the directions of law enforcement officers, but not in-person
oral statements. It also shows that Inciarrano properly relied on Fourth
Amendment analysis. Finally, it shows that the 1974 amendment does not
prohibit the interception of oral statements with small, hidden devices by a
party to an oral statement.
Ideally, the Florida Supreme Court will come to this realization when it
reviews McDade, and will uphold the ice cream truck driver's conviction
simply because he knew he was speaking with his stepdaughter when she
secretly recorded his statements. It did not matter whether he was
admitting guilt or speaking in his own bedroom. The dispositive factor is
that he knew he was speaking with his stepdaughter and that she was free
to disclose to others whatever he said. Those circumstances alone could
not reasonably justify any subjective expectation that his statements would
not be intercepted and, therefore, the statements simply do not fall within
the definition of "oral communication" in section 934.02(2).
V. Proposal to the Florida Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court may not decide McDade correctly. If so,
then the question remains as to whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution or article I, section 4, of the
Florida Constitution requires invalidation of chapter 934 in circumstances
akin to the McDade case or any circumstance.
Although the Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute's
constitutionality in Shevin,1 84 the same result should not be reached due to
subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Both the state

individual has a greater incentive to manipulate a recording than a victim. This distinction seens
to run afoul of the presumption of innocence. An accused might tape witnesses to obtain
evidence that they threatened to bring false charges against him, rather than to manufacture false
evidence of innocence. Also, it is notable that the judge in Loor had been surreptitiously taped
when he was in private practice. Brugmann v. State, 117 So. 39, 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(Rothenberg, J., dissenting).
184. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723, 727 (Fla. 1977).
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and federal courts in Illinois have considered whether all-party consent
statutes are constitutional today, and both have held they are not.
In ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez,'8 5 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit considered ACLU's argument claiming Illinois's
all-party consent statute could not be constitutionally applied to
prohibit citizens from intercepting the oral communications of police
officers performing their duties in public. Illinois had adopted a law in
1961 that made it a crime to use an eavesdropping device to hear or
record all, or part of, any oral conversation without the consent of any
party thereto. 186 Like Florida, Illinois amended its law to require the
consent of all parties.18 7 After multiple judicial battles over the meaning
of the amendment produced results like Inciarrano and McDade,
which allowed parties to record communications without consent,'88
the Illinois legislature amended its law again in 1994 to prevent
ambiguity in the statute.
The ACLU sued to enjoin enforcement of the statute against audio
recordings that the ACLU planned to make in connection with a "police
accountability program," which involved openly recording officers without
their consent in public places while performing their duties and when
speaking at a volume audible to the unassisted human ear.1 89 The district
court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed and
directed entry of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the
Illinois law as it was being applied. 190 Although the law operated to
prevent interceptions of communications, rather than as a prior restraint on
the dissemination of previously known information, the court of appeals,
citing Citizens United v. FEC,' 9' held that this "is a straightforward
application of the principle that '[1]aws enacted to control or suppress
speech may operate at different points in the speech process."" 92 The court
of appeals found the ACLU's "First Amendment interests are quite strong"
because the law interferes with free discussion of public affairs.'93
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the law "restricts a medium of
expression-the use of a common instrument of communication-and thus
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an integral step in the speech process."l 94 The court surveyed the United
States Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence from Branzburg v.
Hayes 95 to Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.1 96 The court then concluded that
although the statute was content neutral, it would likely fail intermediate
scrutiny because it did not materially advance the privacy interests that it
supposedly had been enacted to serve. 97
Most important for Florida, the court of appeals noted that its decision
would not cast a shadow over the enforceability of the communications
interception statutes of most states because "the Illinois statute is a
national outlier." 98 While most states allow interception by any party to a
communication, Illinois, like Florida, was one of the few all-party
consent states.199
While the court of appeals' decision only directed entry of a
preliminary injunction, the district court held on remand that the Illinois
statute was unconstitutional as applied. 200 The Illinois Supreme Court then
did the federal courts one better in People v. Melongo,2 0 1holding the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The court reasoned that the
statute "burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to serve a
legitimate state interest in protecting conversational privacy."20 2 If Florida
Statutes' chapter 934 were interpreted as similarly broad, it also would
facially violate the First Amendment.
The Florida Supreme Court should take these decisions into
consideration when ruling in McDade. Although the constitutionality of
chapter 934 is not squarely at issue in that case,203 a familiar rule of
statutory construction is that "[w]henever possible, statutes should be
construed in such a manner so as to avoid an unconstitutional result."204
Application of that rule in McDade should lead the Florida Supreme Court
to conclude that what the young victim did in McDade was lawful because
chapter 934 does not prohibit interception of oral statements without
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consent by a party to the statements. Additionally, if the court properly
applies precedent, then the court should conclude that the victim's actions
were legal and the interception of oral statements by any party to those
statements is and always has been legal in Florida.
For those fearful that such a ruling would encourage extensive secret
recordings of private conversations and dissuade candid human exchanges,
rest assured that even when interception is lawful without consent or a
court order, public disclosure may be tortious if it simply draws extensive
attention to truthful intimate facts that are not of public concem 205 or
206
defames by presenting words out of context.
The common law carefully
developed these torts over centuries to strike a delicate balance between
privacy and free expression.

VI. Conclusion
Understanding the operation of chapter 934 of the Florida statutes is a
challenging task. Holing up in a Doubletree hotel with a warm chocolate
chip cookie for a full day is what it takes to get the job done. If you do not
have time to do that, or to digest this entire article, here are the conclusions
I have reached:
Interception of wire and interception of oral communications without
the consent of all parties raise Fourth Amendment concerns, but both are
useful law enforcement techniques, and both implicate the First
Amendment rights of journalists and ordinary citizens. When the Supreme
Court first considered a police wiretapping case in Olmstead,20 7 it found no
Fourth Amendment violation because the agents had not physically entered
a home. Congress reacted by banning warrantless wiretapping by both
police and private citizens. This spurred law enforcement agencies to start
using hidden microphones that could intercept oral communications
without tapping wires. The advent of this listening technology escalated
privacy concerns and persuaded the United States Supreme Court in Katz 208
to hold that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unseen agents from
intercepting oral communications with hidden devices. This decision
threatened to undermine the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies for
which Congress passed new legislation specifying procedures for obtaining
judicial approval of interception of oral communications without consent.
205.

See, e.g., Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1945) (recognizing publication of private

facts as a tort).
206. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2008) (recognizing libel by
implication through publication of stepmother's private communication with stepson regarding
her religious beliefs).
207. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
208. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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Some states, including Florida, followed suit by enacting similar
legislation. These enactments accommodated most law enforcement needs,
but warrantless use of hidden microphones by police in the form of body
bugs remained a desirable law enforcement tool. When the United States
Supreme Court was pressed to hold that use of such tools violates the
Fourth Amendment, it refused to do so in White2 09 by arguing that a
constitutional bar against body bugs would do nothing to protect privacy
interests because the law enforcement agent on whom the bug was planted
would be free to disclose the communication from memory.
In the 1970s, the Florida legislature amended its interception of
communications law with the apparent objective of stopping journalists
and other citizens, but not police, from recording telephone calls
without the consent of all parties. It used confusing, unnatural definitions
in an attempt to accomplish this goal, and the consequence was that
journalists and the courts misunderstood the amendment as attempting
to ban the nonconsensual recording of both telephone calls and face-to-face
oral communications. This incorrect interpretation of the amendment
threatened to require courts to free criminals who had been caught redhanded by citizens with hidden recorders. As a result, Florida courts
created impractical common law exceptions to the law.
The McDade case is the most recent example of this phenomenon,
and the Florida Supreme Court has an opportunity to correct its past
mistakes. The court should hold that the young victim was legally allowed
to record her stepfather's oral statements, thereby allowing journalists and
other citizens to use hidden recorders in without obtaining consent.
If the Florida Supreme Court declines to do so and overturns McDade's
conviction, the result will be a dramatic demonstration that a statute that
prohibits in-person recording of oral communications without consent
harms state interests without protecting legitimate privacy interests of
any sort.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled in
AlvareZ 210 that a statute with such pernicious results cannot stand in the
face of modern First Amendment theory. Therefore, if the Florida Supreme
Court fails in McDade to correct the problem its jurisprudence has created,
it will be inviting a federal challenge to the law or an amendment clarifying
that the law does not prohibit a party to an oral communication frotn
recording it without consent.
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